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UNITED STATES
INFORMATION
AGENCY

Office of Research and Analysis

WEST EUROPEAN CLIMATE OF OPINION
ON THE EVE OF THE PARIS SUMMIT CONFERENCE

I. General Standing Of The U.S. vs. The U.S.S.R.
In An Atmosphere Of Detente

WE-62

April, 1960

SURVEY RESEARCH STUDIES
West European Public Opinion Barometer

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FOREWORD

The present report is the first of three based upon the latest round of Barometer surveys in Western Europe. The current soundings were timed to describe the West European climate of opinion on the eve of the Paris Summit Conference as a contribution to guidance for Summit preparations. For a correct perspective on the overall import of the latest findings this initial report on U.S. versus U.S.S.R. general standing should be read together with the report following which compares current and anticipated U.S.-U.S.S.R. standings in science, military strength, and other areas of competition. The third report describes the current standing of NATO in West European opinion.

The findings reported are based upon coordinated surveys in Great Britain, France, West Germany and Italy, conducted between mid-February and mid-March 1960. As usual, interviewing was performed via contracts with local survey organizations¹ and under their own auspices with no indication to respondents of any American connection with the surveys.

Sampling for each country was conducted on the basis of probability principles to ensure an accurate cross section of the population 21 years of age and above. The size of the overall sample in each country was approximately 1200 cases. However, because information was needed on a large number of issues, extensive use was made of the so-called "split-ballot" technique wherein particular questions are asked of half-samples of the order of 600 cases. This procedure permits coverage of a larger number of issues while still yielding figures of acceptable reliability for broad guidance purposes, since percentages based upon 600 cases are highly unlikely to differ by as much as the order of six per cent from the results that would be obtained from a complete census of the population sampled. Moreover, from the point of view of reflecting West European opinion in the four major nations, rather than particular countries, the sample is of the order of 2400 cases and thus permits general estimates of considerable precision.

The use of the split half method also has important methodological advantages in permitting a check on the effect of differences in question formulations through giving each of two versions to random halves of the sample and observing to what extent the results differ.

As readers of the Barometer series have been frequently reminded, differences between percentages in trend comparisons are only to be considered significant if they are appreciable enough to be reliably beyond chance variation. Conclusions drawn in the text take such considerations into account. Anyone interested in statistical details, or in further information on any other aspects of the present survey, is invited to consult the Survey Research Division, Office of Research and Analysis, USIA.

Frequently throughout this and other Barometer reports readers will note that comparisons are made not in terms of the percentage favorable to the U.S. on a given issue but in terms of a net favorable figure -- favorable answers minus unfavorable answers. Such an index often provides a useful basis of comparison since it helps take into account the extent to which favorable responses are offset by unfavorable.

The need for maximum speed in issuing the present series of reports precludes consideration of how the opinion of more elite elements of the population compares with the sentiments of the general public. It is hoped that such information can later be made available to anyone interested. Also as time permits an analysis is planned of the relationship of answers to particular questions to answers to other questions. Such "crossbreaks" are frequently useful in additionally clarifying the precise significance of particular answer patterns.

¹ Social Surveys (Gallup Poll) Ltd., London; DIVO, Bad Godesberg; Institut Français d'Opinion Publique, Paris; Istituto Italiano dell' Opinione Pubblica, Milan.

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S U M M A R Y

The indication from the latest measurements of the West European climate of opinion is that the U.S. will be entering the forthcoming Summit Conference with a level of esteem both for America and for President Eisenhower that has never been higher in Barometer surveys to date. While favorable opinion of the U.S.S.R. and Premier Khrushchev is also above past levels except in West Germany, in an absolute sense it remains far behind that of the U.S. The results from several lines of inquiry make it evident that feelings of an East-West detente are, except in West Germany, very much at work among large segments of the West European public in influencing these and other attitudes toward the two major powers.

Despite the atmosphere of detente, expectations of beneficial results from the forthcoming Summit Conference are modest, with optimism outweighed by cautious skepticism and outright pessimism. Peace in general and disarmament or arms limitation in particular are what West Europeans primarily want out of the Summit Conference. Only in West Germany is there any strong preoccupation with German reunification and the status of Berlin. Concern about the posture of Western conference participants is most in evidence in respect to President De Gaulle who, except in West Germany, is judged as more likely to make too few than too many concessions to the Soviets.

On seriousness of effort to achieve disarmament the U.S. continues to rank ahead of the U.S.S.R. in West Germany and Italy, but has declined to virtually a standoff with the U.S.S.R. in Great Britain and France. In general credibility, however, in terms of correspondence of words with deeds, there have been marked improvements in U.S. standing from low points registered two years back. Soviet general credibility has also apparently gained somewhat, but is still found lacking by large predominances in all four countries surveyed.

Along with the high level of esteem registered for the U.S. in the current survey are very favorable levels in feelings of agreement of basic interests with those of the U.S. Current measures in three countries are as high or higher than have yet been obtained in Barometer surveys to date. But despite these very favorable trends, there is no indication in the present survey of any increased inclination to "side with the U.S." as vis-à-vis the U.S.S.R. in the present world situation. Willingness to side with the U.S., or more generally "the West," continues at a fairly high level in West Germany, but in Great Britain is clearly down from its highest point, in Italy is equaled or exceeded by neutralism and pro-Soviet orientations, and in France is heavily outweighed by neutralist sentiments.

This last pattern of attitudes may imply nothing more than an understandable unwillingness to accept the cold war concept of "taking sides" in a period of detente. But in the light of adverse findings presented on U.S. versus Soviet military and scientific standings in the following paper in the present series, it could possibly betoken some lack of confidence in the U.S. as riding the wave of the future.

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I. Comparative Trends in General Standing

ESTEEM FOR THE U.S. ...

The indication from the latest soundings of public opinion abroad is that the U.S. will be entering the forthcoming Paris Summit Conference with a level of West European esteem that has never been higher in Barometer surveys to date.

Considering the four countries individually the most notable and consistent growth in U.S. standings in recent surveys has occurred in France. As may be noted from the figures tabulated on the page following, the predominance of good opinion of the U.S. over adverse opinion is currently at a high point that marks a considerable rise over levels which have generally prevailed in earlier surveys.

Esteem for the U.S. in West Germany is as high as ever previously recorded and is at very high levels in Great Britain and Italy -- though, it will be observed, not as high as were registered in special surveys in these two countries at the time of the President's visits.¹

ESTEEM FOR THE U.S.S.R. ...

Current standing of the U.S.S.R. in general esteem is also relatively high in comparison to past levels. West Germany is largely an exception in this respect with a marked worsening of Soviet standing in the present survey from its best record (which was still heavily minus in the net) registered in November 1959.

Despite recent gains, however, favorable opinion of the Soviet Union is still equaled or exceeded by unfavorable opinion in all the four countries surveyed, and in any absolute sense Soviet standing is far behind that of the U.S. The difference verges on the astronomical in West Germany and is least in France.

¹ President Eisenhower's trip to Great Britain in September of 1959 was accompanied by a brief upsurge in net favorable opinion of the U.S. to the highest level recorded before or since in British measurements. Both the anticipation of the President's visit to Italy and its consummation were associated with rises in esteem which reached at one point the remarkable level of a 78 per cent predominance of favorable opinion. For further details bearing upon both the nature and the durability of the impact of the President's visits on general Italian and British opinion, readers are referred to West European Barometer No. 61, "The Impact of the Current Cold-War Detente Upon Trends in U.S. Versus U.S.S.R. Standings," January, 1960, CONFIDENTIAL, and Foreign Service Despatch, Rome, No. 117, March 29, 1960.

"Please use this card to tell me your feelings about various countries. How about....?"
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OPINION ABOUT THE U.S.

In Great Britain

	Oct. '54	Feb. '55	June '55	Aug. '55	Dec. '55	Apr. '56	Nov. '56	May '57	Nov. '57	Oct. '58	Apr. ² '59	Sep. ² '59	Nov. ² '59	Dec. ² '59	Feb. '60
No. of cases	(832)	(805) ¹	(800)	(800)	(770)	(806)	(605)	(605)	(800)	(611)		(1000)	(1000)		(1221)
Very good opinion	10%	14%	19%	24%	25%	20%	16%	18%	13%	15%		34%	18%		18%
Good opinion	39	42	39	38	35	40	38	30	35	46		43	45		48
Neither good nor bad opinion ³	28	31	28	28	30	25	31	35	35	19	NA	18	21	NA	18
Bad opinion	7	5	4	3	2	4	6	6	6	8		2	7		5
Very bad opinion	2	1	2	1	1	2	1	1	2	1		1	1		1
No opinion	14	7	8	6	7	9	8	10	9	11		2	8		10
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%		100%	100%		100%
Net Favorable ("Very good" and "Good" less "Bad" and "Very bad")	40	50	52	58	57	54	47	41	40	52		74	55		60

In West Germany

	(836)	(820)	(857)	(865)	(813)	(863)	(589)	(611)	(813)	(610)		(1258) ²		(1222)
Very good opinion	10%	9%	15%	12%	15%	10%	15%	12%	12%	11%		15%		13%
Good opinion	51	52	48	47	42	44	48	47	52	57		52	NA	57
Neither	25	26	18	21	27	29	19	27	21	18	NA	20		18
Bad opinion	3	2	5	3	3	4	2	4	3	3		2		2
Very bad opinion	1	-	1	1	*	1	1	1	1	*		*		*
No opinion	10	11	13	16	13	12	15	9	11	11		11		10
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%		100%		100%
Net Favorable	57	59	57	55	54	49	60	54	60	65		65		68

* Throughout report indicates less than one-half of one per cent.

1. Owing to an inadvertent transposition of columns that came to light in recent checking, the figures for U.S. and French standing in Gt. Britain in the February 1955 survey have been in error in past presentations. They are now shown correctly and eliminate what appeared to be rather puzzling departures from expected levels of esteem.

2. The survey results shown for these dates on this and succeeding tables were obtained as interim measures between regular Barometer surveys, chiefly by means of rider questions on ongoing surveys of the same organizations. The symbol NA on some of these tables indicates that data are not available for that country at that time.

3. In some country surveys the choice is "Fair opinion".

OPINION ABOUT THE U.S.

<u>In France</u>															
	Oct. '54	Feb. '55	June '55	Aug. '55	Dec. '55	Apr. '56	Nov. '56	May '57	Nov. '57	Oct. '58	Apr. '59	Sep. '59	Nov. '59	Dec. '59	Feb. '60
No. of cases	(851)	(900)	(800)	(800)	(805)	(800)	(651)	(602)	(802)	(624)			(1070)		(1228)
Very good opinion	3%	4%	3%	6%	7%	4%	4%	3%	2%	4%			8%		3%
Good opinion	17	26	17	29	31	20	25	24	19	33			31		41
Neither	34	31	36	36	34	34	37	41	38	37	NA	NA	41	NA	35
Bad opinion	14	11	12	10	10	15	17	13	19	12			7 ¹		8
Very bad opinion	6	4	4	3	3	5	4	3	5	2			1 ¹		1
No opinion	26	24	28	16	15	22	13	16	17	12			12		12
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%			100%		100%
Net Favorable	0	15	4	22	25	4	8	11	-3	23			31		35
<u>In Italy</u>															
No. of cases	(808)	(814)	(826)	(802)	(803)	(911)	(605)	(634)	(807)	(635)	(1076)		(691)	(650)	(1170)
Very good opinion	26%	26%	31%	33%	34%	32%	37%	31%	34%	29%	30%		32%	41%	29%
Good opinion	33	35	35	34	33	38	36	39	36	38	38		39	39	40
Neither	16	17	13	15	16	14	12	15	12	12	14	NA	13	8	13
Bad opinion	7	4	7	4	6	4	5	5	6	9	6		4	2	5
Very bad opinion	3	4	4	2	4	3	1	2	3	5	3		1	*	3
No opinion	15	14	10	12	7	9	9	8	9	7	9		11	10	10
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%		100%	100%	100%
Net Favorable	49	53	55	61	57	63	67	63	61	53	59		66	78	61

¹ Owing to an error in telegraphic communication the per cent very bad opinion in France, and the net index based upon it, were incorrectly reported in West European Barometer report No. 61, "The Impact of the Current Cold-War Detente Upon Trends in U.S. Versus U.S.S.R. Standings."

OPINION ABOUT THE U.S.S.R.

In Great Britain

	Oct. '54	Feb. '55	June '55	Aug. '55	Dec. '55	Apr. '56	Nov. '56	May '57	Nov. '57	Oct. '58	Apr. '59	Sep. '59	Nov. '59	Dec. '59	Feb. '60
No. of cases	(832)	(805)	(800)	(800)	(770)	(806)	(605)	(605)	(800)	(611)		(1000)	(1000)		(1221)
Very good opinion	1%	5%	3%	2%	1%	2%	-	3%	2%	1%		3%	3%		1%
Good opinion	5	26	7	12	7	12	3	3	10	9		10	21		19
Neither	24	38	32	44	29	32	10	18	25	28	NA	43	30	NA	30
Bad opinion	21	6	22	16	25	20	24	26	25	27		23	22		25
Very bad opinion	23	3	14	7	19	13	55	37	20	19		13	11		9
No opinion	26	22	22	19	19	21	8	16	18	16		8	13		16
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%		100%	100%		100%
Net Favorable	-38	22	-26	-9	-36	-19	-76	-60	-33	-36		-23	-9		-14

In West Germany

	(836)	(820)	(857)	(865)	(813)	(863)	(589)	(611)	(813)	(610)			(1258)		(1222)
No. of cases															
Very good opinion	3%	3%	1%	1%	3%	3%	3%	3%	3%	-%			1%		3%
Good opinion	5	6	6	7	2	3	2	3	3	4			6		4
Neither	13	17	24	18	16	18	7	13	16	18	NA	NA	34	NA	21
Bad opinion	28	34	31	29	33	30	25	31	36	43			32		38
Very bad opinion	40	29	24	25	32	34	53	42	33	23			14		23
No opinion	14	14	14	20	17	15	13	11	12	12			13		14
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%			100%		100%
Net Favorable	-63	-57	-48	-46	-63	-61	-76	-70	-66	-62			-39		-57

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OPINION ABOUT THE U.S.S.R.

In France

	Oct. '54	Feb. '55	June '55	Aug. '55	Dec. '55	Apr. '56	Nov. '56	May '57	Nov. '57	Oct. '58	Apr. '59	Sep. '59	Nov. '59	Dec. '59	Feb. '60
No. of cases	(851)	(900)	(800)	(800)	(805)	(800)	(651)	(602)	(802)	(624)			(1070)		(1228)
Very good opinion	3%	3%	2%	4%	3%	4%	1%	2%	2%	1%			3%		1%
Good opinion	6	10	9	10	10	8	4	7	9	8			14		20
Neither	14	17	24	31	27	27	13	19	26	26	NA	NA	44	NA	34
Bad opinion	26	24	21	23	23	22	27	27	26	28			19		22
Very bad opinion	15	14	10	9	13	11	38	22	13	18			4		6
No opinion	36	32	34	23	24	28	17	23	24	19			16		17
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%			100%		100%
Net Favorable	-32	-25	-20	-18	-23	-21	-60	-40	-28	-37			-6		-7

In Italy

	(808)	(814)	(826)	(802)	(803)	(911)	(605)	(634)	(807)	(635)	(1076)		(691)	(650)	(1170)
Very good opinion	6%	7%	6%	7%	8%	8%	3%	5%	7%	13%	7%		12%	12%	13%
Good opinion	12	7	10	12	13	11	7	9	12	16	13		20	19	18
Neither	12	11	17	19	16	16	9	9	15	18	19	NA	23	24	18
Bad opinion	21	23	24	21	27	22	25	25	23	24	23		17	17	16
Very bad opinion	27	29	24	20	23	27	45	37	30	19	24		12	12	19
No opinion	22	23	19	21	13	16	11	15	13	10	14		16	16	16
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%		100%	100%	100%
Net Favorable	-30	-38	-32	-22	-29	-30	-60	-48	-34	-14	-27		3	2	-4

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ESTEEM FOR PRESIDENT EISENHOWER...

What is true for the U.S. as a country also is true for President Eisenhower as its leader: West European esteem, taking the four countries together, has never been higher.

Again in studying the individual country trends one may note, both in the September 1959 survey in Great Britain and in the November and December surveys in Italy, the bulge in esteem for the President that appears to have accompanied his visits abroad.

"Please use this card to tell me what your feelings are about political leaders in various countries. How about... President Eisenhower?"

<u>In Great Britain</u>	Aug. '55	Nov. '56	May '57	Nov. '57	Oct. '58	Sept. '59	Nov. '59	Dec. '59	Feb '60
No. of cases	(800)	(605)	(605)	(800)	(587)	(1000)	(1000)		(608)
Very good opinion	33%	36%	17%	16%	21%	42%	21%		31%
Good opinion	39	41	32	35	48	36	45	NA	50
Neither good nor bad opinion ¹	19	18	35	34	18	18	19		11
Bad opinion	2	1	7	7	7	2	6		3
Very bad opinion	-	-	1	2	1	*	2		1
No opinion	7	4	8	6	5	2	7		4
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>		<u>100%</u>
Net Favorable	70	76	41	42	61	76	58		77

<u>In West Germany</u>									
No. of cases	(865)	(589)	(611)	(813)	(585)		(1258)		(623)
Very good opinion	12%	29%	23%	12%	15%		20%		22%
Good opinion	43	49	49	55	52	NA	54	NA	55
Neither	16	10	14	17	17		13		10
Bad opinion	4	1	1	1	2		2		1
Very bad opinion	*	*	*	*	*		*		*
No opinion	25	11	13	15	14		11		12
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>		<u>100%</u>		<u>100%</u>
Net Favorable	51	77	71	66	65		72		76

<u>In France</u>									
No. of cases	(800)	(651)	(602)	(802)	(596)		(1070)		(620)
Very good opinion	12%	7%	4%	3%	7%		13%		10%
Good opinion	32	38	30	27	37	NA	41	NA	52
Neither	22	34	36	31	35		30		24
Bad opinion	8	5	7	10	5		3		4
Very bad opinion	3	2	2	3	1		1		-
No opinion	23	14	21	26	15		12		10
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>		<u>100%</u>		<u>100%</u>
Net Favorable	33	38	25	17	38		50		58

<u>In Italy</u>									
No. of cases	(802)	(605)	(634)	(807)	(637)		(691)	(650)	(579)
Very good opinion	28%	42%	34%	30%	24%		35%	45%	29%
Good opinion	34	34	34	35	35	NA	39	35	40
Neither	11	10	14	12	13		10	8	12
Bad opinion	4	2	3	5	8		4	3	3
Very bad opinion	2	1	2	3	3		1	*	2
No opinion	21	11	13	15	17		11	9	14
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>		<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>
Net Favorable	56	73	63	57	48		69	77	64

¹ In some country surveys the choice is "Fair opinion."

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ESTEEM FOR PREMIER KHRUSHCHEV ...

Premier Khrushchev also appears to have gained in esteem in recent surveys in Britain, France and Italy. West Germany, however, is currently a distinct exception in this respect with a level of adverse feeling no less now than in 1957 and 1958. In an absolute sense, however, current feelings toward Khrushchev are at best mixed and at worst (in West Germany) highly unfavorable.

"Please use this card to tell me what your feelings are about political leaders in various countries. How about ... Premier Khrushchev?"

No. of cases	Great Britain					West Germany				
	Nov.	Oct.	Sep.	Nov.	Feb.	Nov.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.	Feb.
	'57 (800)	'58 (587)	'59 (1000)	'59 (1000)	'60 (608)	'57 (813)	'58 (585)	'59 (1258)	'59 ()	'60 (623)
Very good opinion	1%	1%	3%	2%	5%	*%	*%	1%		1%
Good opinion	6	10	15	28	28	2	4	9		4
Neither	23	26	39	28	23	15	16	33	NA	17
Bad opinion	18	25	23	20	23	34	39	30		40
Very bad opinion	21	22	10	9	10	26	23	14		23
No opinion	31	16	10	13	11	23	18	13		15
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%		100%
Net Favorable	-32	-36	-15	1	0	-58	-58	-34		-58

No. of cases	France				Italy				
	Nov.	Oct.	Sep.	Nov.	Nov.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.	Feb.
	'57 (802)	'58 (596)	'59 (1070)	'60 (620)	'57 (807)	'58 (637)	'59 (691)	'60 (650)	'61 (579)
Very good opinion	1%	1%		4%	3%	6%	11%	17%	15%
Good opinion	5	5		20	27	10	13	24	25
Neither	16	24	NA	37	31	11	15	20	25
Bad opinion	19	24		17	17	23	20	14	12
Very bad opinion	15	24		5	6	25	18	9	8
No opinion	44	22		17	16	25	23	16	15
	100%	100%		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Net Favorable	-28	-42		2	7	-32	-14	18	20

RECIPROCAL ESTEEM FOR GREAT BRITAIN, WEST GERMANY, AND FRANCE ...

In contrast to the very favorable current picture of West European esteem for the U.S. and President Eisenhower, the levels of reciprocal esteem among three countries for which trend data are available (Great Britain, West Germany and France) are only favorable by moderate to low margins, and are currently for all three countries in a declining trend (see Appendix A for tables). The decline is particularly large in respect to good opinion of West Germany in Great Britain, though by a small margin the pattern of opinion still remains on the favorable side in the net. Current levels of reciprocal esteem for major political leaders -- Macmillan, Adenauer and DeGaulle -- are similarly only moderate, and except for Prime Minister Macmillan, in a declining trend.

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APPROVAL OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY ...

Though approval of recent U.S. foreign policy falls far short of equaling the levels of esteem for the U.S. and President Eisenhower, it has risen markedly in all four countries since the prior four-nation survey in October 1958, and except in France currently predominates by large margins over adverse sentiments.

"Have you a favorable or unfavorable impression of what the American government has been doing about foreign affairs recently? Very or only somewhat?"

Great Britain

	Nov. '56 (1210)	May '57 (1232)	Oct. '58 (587)	Nov. '59	Dec. '59	Feb. '60 (613)
No. of cases						
Favorable - very	6%	7%	8%			12%
Favorable - somewhat	21	17	20			26
Unfavorable - somewhat	34	31	22	NA	NA	15
Unfavorable - very	12	13	11			3
No opinion	27	32	39			44
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>			<u>100%</u>
Net Favorable	-19	-20	-5			20

West Germany

	(1159)	(1200)	(585)			(599)
No. of cases						
Favorable - very	30%	19%	10%			19%
Favorable - somewhat	35	30	20			29
Unfavorable - somewhat	5	10	18	NA	NA	8
Unfavorable - very	1	2	4			2
No opinion	29	39	48			42
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>			<u>100%</u>
Net Favorable	59	37	8			38

France

	(1227)	(1200)	(624)			(608)
No. of cases						
Favorable - very	1%	2%	2%			2%
Favorable - somewhat	14	12	16			26
Unfavorable - somewhat	41	31	27	NA	NA	22
Unfavorable - very	12	12	8			1
No opinion	32	43	47			49
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>			<u>100%</u>
Net Favorable	-38	-29	-17			5

Italy

	(1209)	(1269)	(637)	(691)	(650)	(591)
No. of cases						
Favorable - very	36%	29%	16%	28%	39%	23%
Favorable - somewhat	21	19	12	16	17	15
Unfavorable - somewhat	5	6	4	4	1	4
Unfavorable - very	3	6	14	4	2	3
No opinion	35	40	54	48	41	55
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>
Net Favorable	49	36	10	36	53	31

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APPROVAL OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY...

Approval of recent Soviet foreign policy has also markedly grown in all countries surveyed, and currently in France is at a level approximately as favorable as that registered for U.S. foreign policy. In Italy there has apparently been some trailing off in favorable sentiment since November and December of 1959, but current reactions are still predominantly favorable, in contrast to the heavily negative preponderance of sentiment recorded in earlier surveys.

"Now talking particularly about the handling of foreign affairs, have you a favorable or unfavorable impression of what Soviet Russia has been doing in foreign affairs recently? Very or only somewhat?"

<u>Great Britain</u>	Nov. '56	May '57	Nov. '59	Dec. '59	Feb. '60
No. of cases	(1210)	(1232)			(613)
Favorable - very	*%	1%			6%
Favorable - somewhat	1	5	NA	NA	23
Unfavorable - somewhat	10	20			25
Unfavorable - very	76	42			9
No opinion	<u>13</u>	<u>32</u>			<u>37</u>
	100%	100%			100%
Net Favorable	-85	-56			-5

<u>West Germany</u>					
No. of cases	(1159)	(1200)			(599)
Favorable - very	*%	2%			3%
Favorable - somewhat	2	6	NA	NA	11
Unfavorable - somewhat	9	16			19
Unfavorable - very	75	40			26
No opinion	<u>14</u>	<u>36</u>			<u>41</u>
	100%	100%			100%
Net Favorable	-82	-48			-31

<u>France</u>					
No. of cases	(1227)	(1200)			(608)
Favorable - very	2%	2%			3%
Favorable - somewhat	3	6	NA	NA	26
Unfavorable - somewhat	23	22			21
Unfavorable - very	53	31			6
No opinion	<u>19</u>	<u>39</u>			<u>44</u>
	100%	100%			100%
Net Favorable	-71	-45			2

<u>Italy</u>					
No. of cases	(1209)	(1269)	(691)	(650)	(591)
Favorable - very	3%	7%	20%	20%	17%
Favorable - somewhat	4	6	22	26	15
Unfavorable - somewhat	6	7	6	5	5
Unfavorable - very	64	37	5	5	9
No opinion	<u>23</u>	<u>43</u>	<u>47</u>	<u>44</u>	<u>54</u>
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Net Favorable	-63	-31	31	36	18

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II. The Spirit Of Camp David

Examination of the sentiments that lie behind the general standings of the U.S. and the Soviet Union, their leaders and their foreign policies, reveals that the spirit of Camp David is still very much at work in influencing the outlook of large segments of the West European public. This is the indication that emerges from several lines of inquiry, the results of which follow.

TREND IN COLD WAR TENSION...

From the figures below it may first be observed that, except in West Germany, the predominant feeling is that cold war tension between the Western Powers and the Soviet Union has decreased in the past several months.

"Thinking over the state of relations between the Western powers and the Soviet Union over the past six months, would you say in general that cold war tension has increased, diminished, or remained about the same? If "Increased" or "Diminished": "Very much or only somewhat?"

	<u>Great Britain</u>	<u>West Germany</u>	<u>France</u>	<u>Italy</u>
	<u>Feb.</u>	<u>Feb.</u>	<u>Feb.</u>	<u>Feb.</u>
	<u>'60</u>	<u>'60</u>	<u>'60</u>	<u>'60</u>
No. of cases	(613)	(599)	(608)	(591)
Increased very much	{ 11%	{ 26%	{ 9%	{ 8%
Increased somewhat				
Diminished somewhat	{ 42	{ 15	{ 43	{ 37
Diminished very much				
Remained about the same	34	36	28	27
No opinion	13	23	20	28
	100%	100%	100%	100%

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Secondly, from a further series of inquiries it is apparent that outside of West Germany the viewpoint predominates that in recent months the U.S.S.R. has evidenced a greater willingness than before to make concessions to the West.

"Is it your impression that the U.S.S.R. has recently become more conciliatory toward the West -- that is, more willing to make concessions, that it is less willing to make concessions, or that it has remained about the same?"

	<u>Great Britain</u>	<u>West Germany</u>	<u>France</u>	<u>Italy</u>
	<u>Feb. '60</u>	<u>Feb. '60</u>	<u>Feb. '60</u>	<u>Feb. '60</u>
No. of cases	(608)	(623)	(620)	(579)
More willing to make concessions	62%	17%	53%	34%
Less willing to make concessions	4	28	4	6
Remained about the same	22	36	26	28
No opinion	12	19	17	32
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

Correspondingly, a considerable proportion in all four countries believe that the U.S. has also become more willing to make concessions to the U.S.S.R. Most of those who hold such an opinion, it is important to observe, view the change in a favorable light. This is not to say, however, that all who perceive no change, or even less conciliatoriness, in current U.S. policy are unhappy: People holding these views also evidence considerable approval, and, in toto, approval of the current U.S. attitude toward Russia -- however it is interpreted -- greatly outweighs disapproval.

"How about the United States? Has the U.S. recently become more willing to make concessions to the U.S.S.R., less willing, or has it remained about the same?"

	<u>Great Britain</u>	<u>West Germany</u>	<u>France</u>	<u>Italy</u>
	<u>Feb. '60</u>	<u>Feb. '60</u>	<u>Feb. '60</u>	<u>Feb. '60</u>
No. of cases	(608)	(623)	(620)	(579)
More willing to make concessions	40%	29%	39%	30%
Less willing to make concessions	9	9	10	7
Remained about the same	37	39	31	29
No opinion	14	23	20	34
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

Unless "No opinion": "Do you approve or disapprove of this?"

More willing:

Approve	32%	23%	33%	24%
Disapprove	2	5	2	3
No opinion	6	1	4	3
	<u>40%</u>	<u>29%</u>	<u>39%</u>	<u>30%</u>

Less willing:

Approve	3%	6%	3%	2%
Disapprove	4	2	6	4
No opinion	2	1	1	1
	<u>9%</u>	<u>9%</u>	<u>10%</u>	<u>7%</u>

About the same:

Approve	16%	22%	11%	11%
Disapprove	10	5	7	12
No opinion	11	12	13	6
	<u>37%</u>	<u>39%</u>	<u>31%</u>	<u>29%</u>

<u>Total Approval</u>	51%	51%	47%	37%
<u>Total Disapproval</u>	16	12	15	19
<u>Total No Opinion</u>	33	37	38	44
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>
Net Favorable	35%	39%	32%	18%

FEAR OF WAR...

Thirdly, the current level of war apprehensions points to lessened East-West tension in the minds of West Europeans. In all four countries fear of war is at a relatively low ebb, particularly in France where now as many as a third go so far as to say that there is "no danger at all" of a world war in the next few years.

"Now I would like to get your ideas on the danger of a world war in the next three or four years. Here is a sort of thermometer (CARD)
Will you please show me how you rate the danger of such a war?"

Great Britain

		Dec. '55	Apr. '56	Nov. '56	May '57	Nov. '57	Oct. '58	Nov. '59	Dec. '59	Feb. '60
No. of cases		(770)	(806)	(605)	(605)	(800)	(611)			(613)
War is certain	100	1%	1%	2%	2%	1%	1%			1%
	70-90	6	6	15	5	6	5			5
	40-60	22	26	38	22	25	27	NA	NA	20
	10-30	31	27	17	26	30	24			30
No danger at all	0	25	29	14	29	25	29			29
No opinion		15	11	14	16	13	14			15
		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%			100%

Appreciable chance of war (40 or more)		29%	33%	55%	29%	32%	33%			26%
---	--	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	--	--	-----

West Germany

No. of cases		(813)	(863)	(589)	(611)	(813)	(610)			(599)
War is certain	100	1%	3%	5%	3%	2%	3%			1%
	70-90	7	7	11	8	7	6			6
	40-60	27	19	37	28	24	27	NA	NA	22
	30-10	29	22	18	25	28	28			32
No danger at all	0	20	39	20	26	26	25			27
No opinion		15	10	9	10	13	11			12
		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%			100%

Appreciable chance of war (40 or more)		35%	29%	53%	39%	33%	36%			29%
---	--	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	--	--	-----

France

No. of cases		(805)	(800)	(1227)	(602)	(802)	(624)			(608)
War is certain	100	1%	1%	2%	3%	2%	1%			-%
	70-90	7	10	20	13	11	6			4
	40-60	23	24	30	25	27	21	NA	NA	21
	10-30	36	31	23	23	23	31			30
No danger at all	0	16	16	11	15	17	24			35
No opinion		17	18	14	21	20	17			10
		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%			100%

Appreciable chance of war (40 or more)		31%	35%	52%	41%	40%	28%			25%
---	--	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	--	--	-----

Italy

No. of cases		(803)	(911)	(605)	(634)	(807)	(635)	(691)	(650)	(591)
War is certain	100	-%	1%	2%	1%	2%	2%	4%	6%	*%
	70-90	7	4	16	8	8	10	3	5	4
	40-60	14	19	31	19	24	30	13	7	14
	10-30	35	29	20	32	30	31	28	25	39
No danger at all	0	22	23	9	12	12	11	29	35	23
No opinion		22	24	22	28	24	16	23	22	20
		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Appreciable chance of war (40 or more)		21%	24%	49%	28%	34%	42%	20%	18%	18%
---	--	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----

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STANDINGS ON PEACE EFFORTS...

Fourthly, trends in judgments on a general index of U.S. and U.S.S.R. efforts to preserve peace in a broad way also appear to reflect a possible detente effect, in the fact that in all four countries present standings on peace efforts for both nations are above the level registered in the last five-nation survey of October 1958, before President Eisenhower's invitation to Premier Khrushchev to visit the United States initiated the present phase of East-West relations.

Readers who wish to study the tabulations which follow are reminded that the results of certain intervening surveys between 1958 and the current one in Great Britain and Italy show complexities because of waxing and waning influences associated with President Eisenhower's visits to these two countries.

REASONS FOR APPROVAL AND DISAPPROVAL OF RECENT U.S. AND SOVIET POLICIES...

Finally, it may be noted that in answer to an open question inquiring as to reasons for one's impressions of recent U.S. and Soviet foreign policies, the most frequent sources of favorable impressions for the U.S., and very markedly for the U.S.S.R., are considerations relating to a detente.

The reasons offered for unfavorable reactions to recent Soviet policies illuminate among other things the considerations which for West Germans have taken most of the bloom off the rose as far as an East-West detente is concerned. The limited expressions of unfavorable impressions of U.S. foreign policy focus mainly on the themes of alleged exploitation and interference in other countries' affairs. France comes up as usual in this connection with some criticism of U.S. Algerian policy.

	Oct. '54	Feb. '55	June '55	Aug. '55	Dec. '55	Apr. '56	Nov. '56	May '57	Nov. '57	Oct. '58	Apr. '59	Sep. '59	Nov. '59	Dec. '59	Feb. '60
<u>Great Britain</u>															
No. of cases	(832)	(805)	(800)	(800)	(770)	(806)	(605)	(1232)	(800)	(587)		(1000)	(1000)		(613)
Yes, America is	39%	36%	40%	56%	53%	42%	44%	42%	42%	41%		53%	38%		51%
No, America is not	30	39	35	23	32	41	35	38	42	44	NA	32	38	NA	33
No opinion	31	25	25	21	15	17	21	20	16	15		15	24		16
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%		100%	100%		100%
Net Favorable ("is" minus "is not")	9	-3	5	33	21	1	9	4	0	-3		21	0		18
<u>West Germany</u>															
No. of cases	(836)	(820)	(857)	(865)	(813)	(863)	(589)	(1200)	(813)	(585)			(1258)		(599)
Yes, America is	48%	34%	39%	49%	43%	37%	64%	54%	41%	43%			50%		53%
No, America is not	27	29	32	27	31	40	19	32	42	41	NA	NA	29	NA	28
No opinion	25	37	29	24	26	23	17	14	17	16			21		19
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%			100%		100%
Net Favorable	21	5	7	22	12	-3	45	22	-1	2			21		25
<u>France</u>															
No. of cases	(851)	(900)	(800)	(800)	(805)	(800)	(651)	(1200)	(802)	(596)	(1027)				(608)
Yes, America is	25%	21%	21%	36%	20%	20%	30%	23%	18%	30%	24%				38%
No, America is not	33	40	36	31	45	47	39	44	52	46	50	NA	NA	NA	31
No opinion	42	39	43	33	35	33	31	33	30	24	26				31
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%				100%
Net Favorable	-8	-19	-15	5	-25	-27	-9	-21	-34	-16	-26				7
<u>Italy</u>															
No. of cases	(808)	(814)	(826)	(802)	(803)	(911)	(605)	(1269)	(807)	(637)	(1076)		(691)	(650)	(591)
Yes, America is	42%	37%	49%	58%	56%	55%	72%	58%	61%	52%	54%		65%	71%	63%
No, America is not	16	15	18	10	18	17	8	16	16	28	19	NA	8	7	16
No opinion	42	48	33	32	26	28	20	26	23	20	27		27	22	21
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%		100%	100%	100%
Net Favorable	26	22	31	48	38	38	64	42	45	24	35		57	64	47

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	Oct. '54	Feb. '55	Jun. '55	Aug. '55	Dec. '55	Apr. '56	Nov. '56	May '57	Nov. '57	Oct. '58	Apr. '59	Sep. '59	Nov. '59	Dec. '59	Feb. '60
<u>Great Britain</u>															
No. of cases	(832)	(805)	(800)	(800)	(770)	(806)	(605)	(1232)	(800)	(587)		(1000)	(1000)		(613)
Yes, Russia is	13%	17%	22%	35%	18%	32%	7%	11%	19%	16%		23%	24%		27%
No, Russia is not	48	44	45	33	63	45	80	64	62	62	NA	53	46	NA	44
No opinion	39	39	33	32	19	23	13	25	19	22		24	30		29
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%		100%	100%		100%
Net Favorable ("is" minus "is not")	-35	-27	-23	2	-45	-13	-73	-53	-43	-46		-30	-22		-17
<u>West Germany</u>															
No. of cases	(836)	(820)	(857)	(865)	(813)	(863)	(589)	(1200)	(813)	(585)			(1258)		(599)
Yes, Russia is	13%	9%	18%	20%	11%	15%	8%	11%	9%	10%			15%		12%
No, Russia is not	65	59	54	56	68	62	79	73	75	74	NA	NA	60	NA	67
No opinion	22	32	28	24	21	23	13	16	16	16			25		21
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%			100%		100%
Net Favorable	-52	-50	-36	-36	-57	-47	-71	-62	-66	-64			-45		-55
<u>France</u>															
No. of cases	(851)	(900)	(800)	(800)	(805)	(800)	(651)	(1200)	(802)	(596)	(1027)				(608)
Yes, Russia is	16%	16%	20%	26%	16%	21%	9%	12%	15%	15%	14%				30%
No, Russia is not	37	38	31	32	49	43	70	58	57	58	64	NA	NA	NA	38
No opinion	47	46	49	42	35	36	21	30	28	27	22				32
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%				100%
Net Favorable	-21	-22	-11	-6	-33	-22	-61	-46	-42	-43	-50				-8
<u>Italy</u>															
No. of cases	(808)	(814)	(826)	(802)	(803)	(911)	(605)	(1269)	(807)	(637)	(1076)		(691)	(650)	(591)
Yes, Russia is	21%	16%	25%	31%	28%	33%	13%	22%	21%	25%	25%		42%	46%	37%
No, Russia is not	28	26	33	22	36	27	58	43	45	38	40	NA	21	20	37
No opinion	51	58	42	47	36	40	29	35	34	37	35		37	34	26
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%		100%	100%	100%
Net Favorable	-7	-10	-8	9	-8	6	-45	-21	-24	-13	-15		21	26	0

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"Have you a favorable or unfavorable impression of what the American Government (Soviet Union) has been doing about foreign affairs recently?"

"What in particular has given you this impression of what the American Government (Soviet Union) has been doing recently about foreign affairs?"

Reasons for favorable impressions of U.S. handling of foreign affairs:

	<u>Great Britain</u>	<u>West Germany</u>	<u>France</u>	<u>Italy</u>
Efforts to preserve peace, prevent war	3%	7%	12%	15%
Economic aid to other countries; assistance to backward countries	7	7	2	10
President Eisenhower's travels, talks with Khrushchev; Nixon's trip to Soviet Union	8	6	4	7
They are our allies, on our side; stand by us, support us; give us economic assistance	5	5	4	-
Willingness to cooperate, to negotiate; agreement to another summit conference	3	7	-	-
U.S. stand on Berlin	-	6	-	-
Efforts to reach an agreement on disarmament	1	1	-	3
U.S. support for German reunification	-	5	-	-
Anti-communist policies; firm stand against Russia	2	1	-	-
Support France's stand in Algeria	-	-	3	-
Clearcut, consistent foreign policies	-	2	-	-
Anti-colonial policy, support for small countries	-	1	-	-
Military aid to Europe	-	1	-	-
Don't interfere in other countries' affairs	-	-	1	-
Favorable opinion of American politics, government, social provisions	-	-	1	-
Other favorable impressions	3	2	1	4
Qualified answers	2	-	-	-
No opinion	7	1	2	3
	41% ¹	52% ¹	30% ¹	42% ¹
TOTAL				

Reasons for favorable impressions of Russia's handling of foreign affairs:

More conciliatory, willing to negotiate; positive attitude toward Summit Conference; friendlier attitude toward West; easing of relations with other countries	11%	6%	15%	18%
Khrushchev's good will visits	6	4	9	6
Desire for peace, disarmament	6	1	-	6
Less secrecy; lifting Iron Curtain; allowing tourists into Russia	2	-	-	-
Rapprochement between France and USSR	-	-	2	-
Russian proposals for German reunification	-	1	-	-
Skill in diplomacy	-	1	-	-
Firm and unyielding in pursuing their aims	-	1	-	-
Success in space and scientific developments	-	-	1	-
Russian way of life, politics, economic and social progress	-	-	1	-
Ratification of commercial treaties with various countries	-	-	-	1
Giving more help to other, smaller, poorer, countries	1	*	-	-
Other favorable impressions	2	*	1	3
No opinion	3	*	-	2
	31% ¹	14%	29%	36% ¹
TOTAL				

¹ Totals add to more than the percentages having a favorable impression of U.S. (Soviet) handling of foreign affairs as some respondents gave more than one answer.

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Reasons for unfavorable impressions of U.S. handling of foreign affairs:

	<u>Great Britain</u>	<u>West Germany</u>	<u>France</u>	<u>Italy</u>
Interference in other countries' affairs, dictatorial	5%	-%	6%	1%
Self-interested motives, can't be trusted, looking out for themselves, "dollar diplomacy"	4	4	2	-
Not genuinely working for peace	1	-	4	2
Failure to support Algerian policies in UN	-	-	5	-
Weak and vacillating foreign policies; too inclined to make concessions to Russia	1	3	-	-
Anti-French policies	-	-	3	-
Failure to act on disarmament, continuing H bomb and atom tests, building H bomb bases in other countries	2	*	-	1
Inflexible, unreasonable foreign policies	-	1	-	-
Position on Berlin, unwilling to give in on Berlin	-	1	-	-
Against France having atomic weapons	-	-	1	-
Politically immature, don't know the facts, childish	*	-	-	-
Criticisms of President Eisenhower	-	-	*	-
Don't always help underdeveloped countries; impose conditions	-	-	*	-
Other unfavorable impressions	3	1	2	2
No opinion	2	-	-	1
TOTAL	18%	10%	23%	7%

Reasons for unfavorable impressions of Russia's handling of foreign affairs:

	7%	8%	9%	4%
Unreliable, deceitful, insincere, can't be trusted, don't keep their promises	7%	8%	9%	4%
Domineering, imperialistic, interfere in other countries' affairs; expanding power and influence	6	8	7	2
Uncooperativeness; rigid, unyielding policies, general trouble-making	3	9	-	-
Demands concerning Berlin	-	8	1	2
Treatment of Hungary; oppression of the satellites	3	-	4	-
Violent propaganda against the West	-	7	-	-
Opposition to German reunification	-	4	-	-
Against disarmament; rearmament of Eastern bloc, a threat to peace	2	1	-	1
Khrushchev's visit to India and Far East; under- mining British interests in India, Far East	3	-	-	-
Giving financial aid to Middle East, UAR, Cuba, underdeveloped countries to further their own ends	3	-	-	-
Anti-French policies in Algeria, Middle East	-	-	3	-
General dislike of Russia, communism	2	-	-	-
Offensive attitude of Khrushchev toward Gronchi	-	-	-	2
Supporting China in Tibetan affair	1	-	-	-
Dictatorship, suppression of freedom in Russia	*	-	-	-
Trouble-making, causing strikes in Great Britain	*	-	-	-
Behavior of Khrushchev in his visits to foreign countries	-	-	-	1
Other unfavorable impressions	3	1	3	3
No opinion	4	1	1	*
TOTAL	37% ¹	47% ¹	28% ¹	15% ¹

¹ Totals add to more than the percentages having an unfavorable impression as some respondents gave more than one answer.

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III. Conference Desires, Expectations and Judgments

CONFERENCE DESIRES ...

What West Europeans primarily want out of the Summit Conference is as obvious in the answers below as it is unsurprising; they want peace. What is more informative in the present findings is the very considerable proportion, for an open question of this kind, who specifically volunteer disarmament or arms limitation. Which means, of course, that this is a matter which must be treated with no little care as far as West European public opinion impacts are concerned. The present standings of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. on the disarmament issue follow in the next section of this report.

"What result do you most want to see come out of this Conference?"

	<u>Great Britain</u>	<u>West Germany</u>	<u>France</u>	<u>Italy</u>
<u>Peace; relaxation of tensions:</u>	64%	38%	66%	65%
Lasting world peace; no more wars	(52%)	(34%)	(63%)	(43%)
Easing of East-West tensions; end of Cold War; basis for further negotiation	(4)	(3)	(3)	(14)
Greater understanding, friendship, trust among nations	(8)	(-)	(-)	(8)
More yielding attitude on part of Eastern Bloc, Russia	(-)	(1)	(-)	(-)
<u>Disarmament; arms limitations:</u>	45	17	22	24
General disarmament; end to arms race; reduction in armaments	(25)	(13)	(22 ¹)	(18)
Ban on nuclear weapons; end to nuclear tests	(20)	(4)	(-)	(6)
<u>Agreement on Berlin, reunification of Germany:</u>	3	57	2	7
<u>Economic welfare for all nations:</u>				
More attention to helping poorer countries, alleviating human suffering, improving living standards	3	-	-	7
<u>Economic cooperation, expansion of world trade:</u>	5	-	4	-
<u>End of war in Algeria:</u>	-	-	4	-
<u>That (British)(French) view would prevail; that (Britain)(France) would emerge as the leading power:</u>	1	-	3	-
<u>Increased freedom of foreign travel:</u>	1	-	-	-
<u>Equal rights for all, regardless of race, creed:</u>	1	-	-	-
<u>Success; any kind of agreement; any results at all:</u>	5	-	-	-
Expect nothing to come out of it	2	1	2	-
Other	2	*	3	3
No opinion	5	11	9	16
TOTAL	137% ²	124% ²	115% ²	122% ²

¹ In France, includes banning nuclear weapons and testing.

² Totals add to more than 100 per cent as some respondents gave more than one answer.

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CONFERENCE EXPECTATIONS...

There is definitely no indication in the findings below of runaway optimism about conference achievements in any of the four countries surveyed. Expectations are highest in Great Britain, but here as in the other three countries optimism is outweighed by cautious skepticism plus outright pessimism. While the individual country differences are slight except in West Germany, the overall indication appears to be of somewhat lower expectations for the present Summit Conference than its 1955 predecessor in Geneva.

"At the Summit Conference of heads of government soon to be held in Paris between the Western Powers and the Soviet Union, what are the chances, in your opinion, of achieving beneficial results -- very good, good, only fair, poor, or very poor?"¹

No. of cases	Great Britain		West Germany		France		Italy	
	Jun. '55	Feb. '60	Jun. '55	Feb. '60	Jun. '55	Feb. '60	Jun. '55	Feb. '60
	(800)	(608)	(857)	(623)	(800)	(620)	(826)	(579)
Very good	11%	9%	2%	1%	1%	2%	2%	6%
Good	29	27	20	7	12	16	13	7
Only fair	39	37	44	36	26	26	21	19
Poor	4	9	11	22	23	26	24	24
Very poor	2	4	3	10	4	11	7	12
No opinion	15	14	20	24	34	19	33	32
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Net Optimism ²	-5	-14	-36	-60	-40	-45	-37	-42

¹ In the June '55 survey the question read as follows: "In the forthcoming Four-Power Conference, what are the chances, in your opinion, of achieving beneficial results?" (Asked after all not aware of conference were informed about it.)

² "Net optimism" equals "good" and "very good" chances minus "only fair" to "very poor" chances.

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FIRMNESS VS. FLEXIBILITY IN CONFERENCE NEGOTIATIONS...

The next query embodies an effort to ascertain to what extent West Europeans feel that each of the Western participants in the Conference can be relied upon to exhibit the right blend of firmness and flexibility in his actions at the meetings. It may be noted first that the minority who express doubts of President Eisenhower in this connection tend more to anticipate too much firmness than too little. The differences are small and not wholly reliable, however, and except in Italy the predominant viewpoint among those with opinions is that President Eisenhower's attitude will be a correct one.

In respect to Prime Minister Macmillan in the present connection the most distinctive indication appears to be somewhat greater concern in West Germany with excessive conciliatoriness than excessive firmness. In Great Britain there is also a small difference in the same direction, but one heavily overshadowed by majority approval of Mr. Macmillan's present posture.

The most marked patterns of concern on the present question are in connection with General DeGaulle, who is predominantly seen in Great Britain as likely to be too inflexible in his conference actions. The same point of view appears in Italy, and to a slight extent even in his own country, France. Criticism in the last case, however, is in the context of majority approval (which of course, as with Macmillan in Britain, may be inflated by a considerable admixture of nationalist loyalty.)

"In conferring with Premier Khrushchev of Soviet Russia at the forthcoming Summit conference, do you think that Prime Minister Macmillan of Great Britain is likely to make more concessions than he should, fewer than he should, or about the right amount? How about President De Gaulle of France? How about President Eisenhower of the U.S.?"

<u>President Eisenhower</u>	<u>Great Britain</u>	<u>West Germany</u>	<u>France</u>	<u>Italy</u>
	Feb. '60	Feb. '60	Feb. '60	Feb. '60
No. of cases	(608)	(623)	(620)	(579)
More	11%	10%	7%	12%
Fewer	24	14	15	12
About right	44	38	39	24
No opinion	21	38	39	52
	100%	100%	100%	100%

Prime Minister Macmillan

More	15%	20%	10%	10%
Fewer	7	9	13	10
About right	60	28	34	13
No opinion	18	43	43	67
	100%	100%	100%	100%

President De Gaulle

More	10%	18%	3%	5%
Fewer	33	14	12	17
About right	23	23	56	15
No opinion	34	45	29	63
	100%	100%	100%	100%

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What degree of firmness West Europeans have in mind as the "right amount" on the preceding query is illuminated by a test question bearing on the issue of concessions to the Soviets relating to the control of Berlin. The viewpoint appears to predominate in all four countries that no concessions should be made to the Soviets on this key issue.

This finding suggests a considerable amount of firmness in West European attitudes on key conference issues. The significance of this one indication, while important, should not be exaggerated, however, since there was not room for further follow-up inquiries testing firmness against the possible price of such an attitude in East-West conflict and danger of war. In these terms West European attitudes were distinctly less than firm, except in West Berlin, during the time of the Berlin crisis.¹

"At the forthcoming Summit Conference the U.S.S.R. may insist on giving the Communist East German government a greater measure of control in Berlin. Would you approve or disapprove of the Western Powers making any concessions on this point?"

	<u>Great Britain</u>	<u>West Germany</u>	<u>France</u>	<u>Italy</u>
	<u>Feb.</u>	<u>Feb.</u>	<u>Feb.</u>	<u>Feb.</u>
	<u>'60</u>	<u>'60</u>	<u>'60</u>	<u>'60</u>
No. of cases	(608)	(623)	(620)	(579)
Approve	16%	4%	11%	19%
Disapprove	56	71	49	33
No opinion	28	25	40	48
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

¹ See West European Barometer No. 59, "West European Public Opinion Reaction To The Berlin Crisis," May, 1959, CONFIDENTIAL.

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IV. U.S. Versus U.S.S.R. Standing On The Disarmament Issue

As already indicated the issue of disarmament has come very much to the forefront of public consciousness in Western Europe and is second only to general references to peace in the statements of peoples surveyed as to what they desire the Summit Conference to achieve.

COMPARATIVE EFFORTS ...

It is therefore of no small importance to check on the relative standing of the U.S. versus the U.S.S.R. on this central issue. The indications from a direct comparison question employed as a trend measure for some time are that in recent surveys the U.S. has dropped to virtually a standoff with the Soviet Union in Great Britain and France, although it retains some lead in West Germany and Italy.

"In your opinion, which country -- the U.S. or the U.S.S.R. -- is making the more serious efforts at the present time toward general disarmament?"

	Great Britain					West Germany				
	Apr.	May	Oct.	Nov.	Feb.	Apr.	May	Oct.	Nov.	Feb.
	'56	'57	'58	'59	'60	'56	'57	'58	'59	'60
No. of cases	(806)	(605)	(587)	(1000)	(613)	(863)	(611)	(585)	(1258)	(599)
U.S.	20%	27%	28%	20%	25%	21%	34%	32%	35%	34%
U.S.S.R.	9	6	10	17	21	7	5	3	6	6
Both equal (Vol.)	10	11	10	22	14	8	11	10	16	13
Neither (Vol.)	14	36	38	20	22	21	34	38	25	29
No opinion	47	20	14	21	18	43	16	17	18	18
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Net Favorable	11	21	18	3	4	14	29	29	29	28

	France					Italy					
	Apr.	May	Oct.	Nov.	Feb.	Apr.	May	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.	Feb.
	'56	'57	'58	'59	'60	'56	'57	'58	'59	'59	'60
No. of cases	(800)	(602)	(624)	(1000)	(608)	(911)	(634)	(637)	(691)	(650)	(591)
U.S.	13%	19%	21%	16%	14%	28%	37%	37%	32%	40%	34%
U.S.S.R.	13	9	7	11	12	11	8	17	14	8	17
Both equal (Vol.)	10	5	7	19	19	11	11	8	26	29	20
Neither (Vol.)	15	37	45	33	38	6	19	21	9	9	14
No opinion	49	30	20	21	17	44	25	17	19	14	15
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Net Favorable	0	10	14	5	2	17	29	20	18	32	17

COMPARATIVE SINCERITY ...

The results of two supplementary questions added to the present survey are more reassuring but should not be taken as entirely offsetting the preceding indications, since the wording in terms of "sincerity of interest" would not seem to be as fundamental as "seriousness of effort," and would seem to be more susceptible to the halo effect of a generalized U.S. lead over the Soviet Union on the qualities of sincerity and trust. Some current indications of how the U.S. stands vis-à-vis

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the U.S.S.R. on the related score of general credibility will be presented in a following section.

"Is it your impression that the Soviet Union is or is not sincerely interested in general disarmament? And what about the U.S. -- is it your impression that the U.S. is or is not sincerely interested in general disarmament?"

	Great Britain	West Germany	France	Italy
	Feb. '60	Feb. '60	Feb. '60	Feb. '60
<u>U.S.S.R.</u>				
No. of cases	(608)	(623)	(620)	(579)
Sincerely interested	34%	12%	23%	29%
Not sincerely interested	49	71	50	40
No opinion	17	17	27	31
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>
Net Favorable	-15	-59	-27	-11
<u>U.S.</u>				
Sincerely interested	54%	53%	31%	46%
Not sincerely interested	31	26	39	23
No opinion	15	21	30	31
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>
Net Favorable	23	27	-8	23

When those who said that they did not believe that the U.S. was sincerely interested in disarmament were asked why they felt so, their answers distributed along the lines indicated below. Among the indications is that an appreciable proportion in Western Europe believe the old Soviet propaganda theme that disarmament would upset the U.S. economy. Since in one of its more interesting reversals, the present Soviet propaganda line has switched to the opposite thesis, future surveys will have the unusual task of recording the combined effects of both U.S. and Soviet efforts to eliminate a particular point of view.

"What makes you think the U.S. is not sincerely interested in disarmament?"

	Great Britain	West Germany	France	Italy
U.S. is afraid of Russia; mutual fear, distrust, competition	8%	11%	8%	6%
U.S. still building armaments, developing new weapons, establishing military bases	8	5	12	3
Bluffing, not really interested in disarmament	5	5	7	4
Disarmament would upset economy, cause unemployment; too much money tied up in arms, too profitable	4	5	6	5
Wants power over other countries, to retain superiority over others; doesn't want to give up any of its might; imperialistic	3	-	2	3
No country can really disarm; arms a necessary evil	3	-	-	-
Supplying military assistance to Algeria	-	-	2	-
Newspapers, radio, TV, other people	1	-	-	-
Other reasons	1	1	-	2
No opinion	-	-	2	1
	<u>33%¹</u>	<u>27%¹</u>	<u>39%</u>	<u>24%¹</u>

¹ Totals add to more than the per cents saying the U.S. is not sincerely interested in disarmament because some respondents gave more than one answer.

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V. U.S. Versus U.S.S.R. Standing On General Credibility

U.S. CREDIBILITY ...

That the U.S. is currently ahead of Soviet Russia in sincerity of interest in disarmament, if not in other respects on this issue, becomes more understandable in the light of some significant and revealing trends in respect to the general credibility of U.S. versus Soviet utterances in terms of their agreement with actions. The indications are that U.S. standing in this important dimension has very substantially increased in Great Britain, West Germany and France, to the point where in the first two countries it has quite wiped out earlier major losses in this connection.

Comparatively, it may be noted that the present level of U.S. credibility, except in France, compares favorably with that enjoyed by Great Britain, for example, in West Germany, France and Italy or that enjoyed by France in Great Britain.

"Would you say that what the United States does in world affairs generally agrees with what it says, or that its actions differ from its words too often?"¹

"What about Great Britain?" (in West Germany, France and Italy).

"What about France?" (in Great Britain)

	UNITED STATES											
	Great Britain			West Germany			France			Italy		
	Feb. '55	Mar. '58	Feb. '60	Feb. '55	Mar. '58	Feb. '60	Feb. '55	Mar. '58	Feb. '60	Feb. '55	Mar. '58	Feb. '60
	(805)	(885)	(608)	(820)	(902)	(623)	(900)	(498)	(620)	(814)	(1365)	(579)
No. of cases												
Agrees	42%	29%	52%	49%	36%	50%	20%	10%	20%	30%	39%	37%
Differs	29	54	31	22	34	21	31	58	42	18	39	33
No opinion	29	17	17	29	30	29	49	32	38	52	22	30
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Net Favorable	13	-25	21	27	2	29	-11	-48	-22	12	0	4

	GREAT BRITAIN			FRANCE	
	West Germany	France	Italy	Great Britain	
	Feb. '60	Feb. '60	Feb. '60	Feb. '60	
	(623)	(620)	(579)	(608)	
No. of cases					
Agrees	27%	20%	13%	27%	
Differs	32	39	32	30	
No opinion	41	41	55	43	
	100%	100%	100%	100%	
Net Favorable	-5	-19	-19	-3	

¹ "Generally" omitted in March 1958 survey.

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U.S.S.R. CREDIBILITY ...

Soviet general credibility has gained somewhat in all four countries, but substantially only in Great Britain, and is still predominantly negative in the net by large margins everywhere. So if, as has been surmised, the spectacular Soviet space achievements that have followed Soviet promises of such have had an effect in enhancing Soviet credibility, the effect does not show up very prominently on the present very generalized index.

This, of course, does not preclude the possibility of large gains on more particularized measures of Soviet believability. But it could seem to suggest that any such large gains -- as say in the domain of Soviet scientific pronouncements -- have not in any considerable sense been generalized to the entire political spectrum.

"And what about the U.S.S.R. -- would you say that what Soviet Russia does in world affairs generally agrees with what it says, or that its actions differ from its words too often?"¹

SOVIET UNION

	Great Britain			West Germany		
	Feb. '55	Mar. '58	Feb. '60	Feb. '55	Mar. '58	Feb. '60
No. of cases	(805)	(885)	(608)	(820)	(902)	(623)
Agrees	17%	15%	22%	9%	3%	4%
Differs	42	72	58	63	76	70
No opinion	41	13	20	28	21	26
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Net Favorable	-25	-57	-36	-54	-73	-66

	France			Italy		
	Feb. '55	Mar. '58	Feb. '60	Feb. '55	Mar. '58	Feb. '60
No. of cases	(900)	(498)	(620)	(814)	(1365)	(579)
Agrees	17%	10%	12%	12%	16%	16%
Differs	32	59	52	30	62	53
No opinion	51	31	36	58	22	31
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Net Favorable	-15	-49	-40	-18	-46	-37

¹ "Generally" omitted in March 1958 survey.

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VI. Current Trends in Feelings Of Common Interests
And Allegiance To The West

MUTUALITY OF BASIC INTERESTS WITH THE U.S. ...

The level of felt mutuality of interests with the U.S. is currently, in three countries out of four, as high as or higher than has yet been obtained in Barometer surveys to date. And in the fourth country, Italy, the predominance of favorable sentiment is large, though not as high as has been registered in the past. In France, however, despite the current gain there is still a great deal of room for improvement.

It may further be noted that the levels of positive judgments about U.S. basic interests compare for the most part very favorably with parallel judgments about British interests or the interests of France.

The favorable trend on a matter as central as perceived accord with U.S. basic interests would appear to be no small plus factor as the United States prepares to enter the Summit Conference.

"In your opinion, are the basic interests of (survey country) and those of the U.S. very much in agreement, fairly well in agreement, rather different, or very different?"

	Great Britain						West Germany						
	Nov. '56	May '57	Nov. '57	Oct. '58	Nov. '59	Feb. '60	Nov. '56	May '57	Nov. '57	Oct. '58	Nov. '59	Dec. '59	Feb. '60
No. of cases	(605)	(605)	(800)	(587)		(1221)	(570)	(611)	(813)				(1222)
Very much in agr.	20%	15%	22%	24%		25%	11%	14%	17%				25%
Fairly well in agr.	57	58	57	55		54	45	49	51				50
Rather different	10	13	12	9	NA	9	13	16	15	NA	NA	NA	9
Very different	3	4	3	2		2	5	4	4				2
No opinion	10	10	6	10		10	26	17	13				14
	100%	100%	100%	100%		100%	100%	100%	100%				100%
Net Favorable	64	56	64	68		68	38	43	49				64

	France					Italy						
No. of cases	(576)	(602)	(802)	(596)	(1228)	(604)	(634)	(807)	(637)	(691)	(650)	(1170)
Very much in agr.	5%	9%	5%	3%	7%	21%	14%	19%	10%	9%	9%	21%
Fairly well in agr.	24	31	22	31	36	35	40	44	37	36	40	32
Rather different	28	25	25	29	NA	10	13	12	12	16	16	16
Very different	8	10	17	9	8	6	10	8	11	15	10	10
No opinion	35	25	31	28	23	28	23	17	30	24	25	21
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Net Favorable	-7	5	-15	-4	9	40	31	43	24	14	23	27

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"How about the basic interests of (survey country) and those of Great Britain?" (in West Germany, France, and Italy) "And those of France?" (in Great Britain) .

	<u>British Interests</u>			<u>French Interests</u>
	<u>West Germany</u>	<u>France</u>	<u>Italy</u>	<u>Great Britain</u>
	Feb. '60	Feb. '60	Feb. '60	Feb. '60
No. of cases	(623)	(620)	(579)	(608)
Very much in agreement	4%	12%	3%	7%
Fairly well in agreement	40	35	18	40
Rather different	27	22	24	23
Very different	6	11	15	6
No opinion	23	20	40	24
	100%	100%	100%	100%
Net Favorable	11	14	-18	18

MUTUALITY OF BASIC INTERESTS WITH THE U.S.S.R. ...

Conversely, in all the countries surveyed the viewpoint predominates by large margins among the respondents that their country's basic interests are not in accord with those of the Soviet Union. The largest proportion who see their basic interests at least fairly well in agreement with the U.S.S.R. is to be found in Great Britain, with a total of 23 per cent. That, despite the extent of the Communist vote in France and Italy, only 16 per cent state that their basic interests are even "fairly well in agreement" with those of the U.S.S.R. would appear to be an indication of some importance.

"How about the basic interests of (survey country) and those of the Soviet Union?"

	<u>Great Britain</u>	<u>West Germany</u>	<u>France</u>	<u>Italy</u>
	Feb. '60	Feb. '60	Feb. '60	Feb. '60
No. of cases	(1221)	(1222)	(1228)	(1170)
Very much in agreement	2%	1%	2%	5%
Fairly well in agreement	21	1	14	11
Rather different	38	16	37	27
Very different	21	66	21	32
No opinion	18	16	26	25
	100%	100%	100%	100%
Net Favorable	-36	-80	-42	-43

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MUTUALITY OF INTERESTS BETWEEN THE U.S.S.R. AND COMMUNIST CHINA ...

Somewhat as an aside in the present survey, the interesting question was studied as the extent to which the basic interests of the U.S.S.R. and Communist China are perceived to be in accord; and whether the two Communist powers are seen as drawing closer together or further apart.

In West European eyes, it will be observed below, the two powers are seen as predominantly in accord in their basic interests, though more to the degree of being "fairly well" rather than "very much" in agreement. Secondly, as to whether Soviet Russia and Communist China will be likely to draw closer together or further apart, opinions appear to be rather divided. Only in Great Britain is there a clear predominance of one point of view, namely that the two nations will draw closer together in their interests and policies in the course of time.

"How about the basic interests of the Soviet Union and Communist China -- would you say they are very much in agreement, fairly well in agreement, rather different, or very different?"

	<u>Great Britain</u>	<u>West Germany</u>	<u>France</u>	<u>Italy</u>
	<u>Feb. '60</u>	<u>Feb. '60</u>	<u>Feb. '60</u>	<u>Feb. '60</u>
No. of cases	(608)	(623)	(620)	(579)
Very much in agreement	27%	16%	19%	20%
Fairly well in agreement	33	35	32	26
Rather different	13	11	14	11
Very different	4	6	6	5
No opinion	23	32	29	38
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>
Net Favorable	43	34	31	30

"Looking into the future, do you believe that over the next decade Soviet Russia and Communist China are likely to draw closer together or further apart in their interests and policies?"

	<u>Great Britain</u>	<u>West Germany</u>	<u>France</u>	<u>Italy</u>
	<u>Feb. '60</u>	<u>Feb. '60</u>	<u>Feb. '60</u>	<u>Feb. '60</u>
No. of cases	(608)	(623)	(620)	(579)
Closer together	46%	26%	26%	23%
Farther apart	24	29	26	16
Remain same (Vol.)	7	8	9	20
No opinion	23	37	39	41
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

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ALLEGIANCE TO THE SIDE OF THE WEST...

Despite increased feelings of common interests with the U.S. and a level of esteem which has risen to the highest point yet recorded for Western Europe, there is no indication in the trend measurements on the page following of any increased inclination to be "on the side of the West." Willingness to side with the West continues at a fairly high level in West Germany, but currently is considerably below its highest point in Great Britain and is predominantly lacking in France and Italy.¹

This pattern of attitudes provides considerable food for thought and a number of possible considerations come to mind. It may be that except in West Germany, which is still under heavy Soviet pressure, there is less and less inclination to accept the cold war frame of reference implied in the concept of "taking sides". In an atmosphere of detente, judgments are perhaps governed more by a desire for independence and freedom of action. But findings to be reported in the following paper in the present series² raise the possibility of other influences at work, namely diminished confidence in the strength of the U.S. vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and increased doubt that the U.S. is the wave of the future.

¹ If the question is formulated more specifically in terms of siding with the U.S. versus the U.S.S.R., instead of West versus East, there is some increase in favorable sentiment in West Germany and Italy, but the overall pattern remains substantially the same -- thus suggesting that the two questions are largely measuring the same thing.

Form A "At the present time, do you personally think that (survey country) should be on the side of the West, on the side of the East, or on neither side?"

Form B "In the present world situation, do you personally think that, on the whole, (survey country) should side with the United States, with the U.S.S.R., or with neither?"

No. of cases	<u>Great Britain</u>		<u>West Germany</u>		<u>France</u>		<u>Italy</u>	
	<u>Feb. '60</u>		<u>Feb. '60</u>		<u>Feb. '60</u>		<u>Feb. '60</u>	
	<u>A</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>B</u>
	(613)	(608)	(599)	(623)	(608)	(620)	(591)	(579)
Side of West (U.S.)	49%	54%	62%	69%	23%	24%	36%	43%
Side of East (U.S.S.R.)	1	3	3	1	3	4	10	11
Neither	37	37	24	21	55	59	38	35
No opinion	13	6	11	9	19	13	16	11
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Net Favorable	11	14	35	47	-35	-39	-12	-3

² West European Barometer No. 63, "West European Climate Of Opinion On The Eve Of The Paris Summit Conference. II. U.S. or U.S.S.R. The Wave Of The Future?" April, 1960, Confidential.

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"At the present time, do you personally think that (survey country) should be on the side of the West, on the side of the East, or on neither side?"

Great Britain

No. of cases	Sep. '52 (1503)	Oct. '54 (832)	Feb. '55 (805)	Jun. '55 (800)	Aug. '55 (800)	Dec. '55 (770)	Apr. '56 (806)	May '57 (1232)	Oct. '57	Nov. '57 (800)	Oct. '58 (611)	Nov. '59 (1000)	Dec. '59	Feb. '60 (613)
Side of the West	57%	59%	45%	52%	42%	54%	51%	53%		58%	49%	45%		49%
Side of the East	*	2	1	1	1	*	2	2	NA	2	2	3	NA	1
Neither side	28	29	40	36	33	32	30	29		28	38	33		37
No opinion	15	10	14	11	24	14	17	16		12	11	19		13
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%		100%	100%	100%		100%
Net Favorable ("West" minus "East" plus "Neither side")	29	28	4	15	8	22	19	22		28	9	9		11

West Germany

	(1591)	(836)	(820)	(857)	(865)	(813)	(863)	(1200)	(2073)	(813)	(610)	(1258)		(599)
Side of the West	58%	60%	56%	52%	58%	56%	59%	66%	67%	63%	63%	64%		62%
Side of the East	*	*	1	1	1	1	1	*	*	*	1	1	NA	3
Neither side	31	31	36	36	27	31	30	27	24	28	29	24		24
No opinion	11	9	7	11	14	12	10	7	9	9	7	11		11
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%		100%
Net Favorable	27	29	19	15	30	24	28	39	43	35	33	39		35

France

	(1345)	(851)		(800)	(800)	(805)	(800)	(602)		(802)	(624)	(1070)		(608)
Side of the West	42%	36%		18%	23%	25%	25%	28%		21%	26%	24%		23%
Side of the East	4	2		3	4	3	5	4		3	4	4		3
Neither side	43	39	NA	57	51	51	45	39	NA	51	57	48	NA	55
No opinion	11	23		22	22	21	25	29		25	13	24		19
	100%	100%		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%		100%	100%	100%		100%
Net Favorable	-5	-5		-42	-32	-29	-25	-15		-33	-35	-28		-35

Italy

	(1505)	(808)	(814)	(826)	(802)	(803)	(911)	(634)		(807)	(635)	(691)	(650)	(591)
Side of the West	40%	40%	38%	37%	38%	37%	42%	46%		42%	31%	34%	46%	36%
Side of the East	3	4	2	4	4	4	5	4		5	11	4	2	10
Neither side	42	39	43	45	34	46	36	34	NA	40	44	41	35	28
No opinion	15	17	17	14	24	13	17	16		13	14	21	17	16
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Net Favorable	-5	-3	-7	-12	0	-13	1	8		-3	-24	-11	9	-12

Appendix -- Tables On Reciprocal Esteem for Great Britain, West Germany and France

"Please use this card to tell me your feelings about various countries. How about..... GREAT BRITAIN?"

<u>In West Germany</u>	Oct. '54	Feb. '55	June '55	Aug. '55	Dec. '55	Apr. '56	Nov. '56	May '57	Nov. '57	Oct. '58	Apr. '59	Nov. '59	Dec. '59	Feb. '60
No. of cases	(836)	(320)	(857)	(865)	(813)	(863)	(589)	(611)	(813)	(610)				(599)
Very good opinion	3%	4%	9%	3%	3%	3%	4%	2%	1%	2%				2%
Good opinion	41	38	38	39	32	28	11	30	31	42	NA	NA	NA	33
Neither good nor bad	38	41	31	32	39	41	35	41	43	32				37
Bad opinion	4	4	6	5	5	9	29	10	6	9				10
Very bad opinion	1	*	1	1	1	2	9	2	1	1				1
No opinion	13	13	15	20	20	17	16	15	18	14				17
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%				100%
Net Favorable	39	38	40	36	29	20	-27	20	25	34				24
<u>In France</u>														
No. of cases	(851)	(900)	(800)	(800)	(805)	(800)	(651)	(602)	(802)	(624)				(608)
Very good opinion	9%	8%	7%	8%	6%	7%	5%	5%	2%	4%				2%
Good opinion	32	36	25	37	29	30	34	37	20	43	NA	NA	NA	31
Neither	29	31	36	31	39	34	34	34	40	30				42
Bad opinion	11	4	7	7	7	7	10	7	16	9				10
Very bad opinion	2	1	1	2	1	1	2	1	3	1				1
No opinion	17	20	24	15	18	21	15	16	19	13				14
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%				100%
Net Favorable	28	39	24	36	27	29	27	34	3	37				22
<u>In Italy</u>														
No. of cases	(808)	(814)	(826)	(802)	(803)	(911)	(605)	(634)	(807)	(635)	(1076)	(691)	(650)	(591)
Very good opinion	3%	4%	10%	7%	5%	8%	3%	8%	10%	9%	8%	7%	9%	8%
Good opinion	18	25	25	22	22	27	13	26	30	34	31	31	30	24
Neither	26	29	29	30	32	31	28	34	24	26	27	34	30	31
Bad opinion	21	14	13	15	19	13	25	13	14	10	12	7	5	6
Very bad opinion	11	8	7	6	9	6	15	6	6	8	6	4	4	6
No opinion	21	20	16	20	13	15	16	13	16	13	16	17	22	25
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Net Favorable	-11	7	15	8	-1	16	-24	15	20	25	21	27	30	20

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"Please use this card to tell me your feelings about various countries. How about ...WEST GERMANY?"

<u>In Great Britain</u>	Oct. '54	Feb. '55	Jun. '55	Aug. '55	Dec. '55	Apr. '56	May '57	Nov. '57	Oct. '58	Apr. '59	Nov. '59	Dec. '59	Feb. '60
No. of cases	(832)	(805)	(800)	(800)	(770)	(806)	(605)	(800)	(611)				(608)
Very good opinion	3%	1%	5%	4%	4%	4%	6%	6%	5%				3%
Good opinion	19	7	22	15	27	19	22	27	43	NA	NA	NA	24
Neither	38	32	39	42	35	33	31	31	21				27
Bad opinion	7	28	9	10	8	11	8	6	6				14
Very bad opinion	3	13	3	3	1	3	2	4	2				3
No opinion	30	19	22	26	25	30	31	26	23				29
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%				100%
Net Favorable	12	-33	15	6	22	9	18	23	40				10
<u>In France</u>	(851)	(900)	(800)	(800)	(805)	(800)	(602)	(802)	(624)				(620)
Very good opinion	1%	1%	1%	-%	2%	2%	2%	3%	6%				3%
Good opinion	8	12	9	13	21	10	18	20	31	NA	NA	NA	30
Neither	23	28	29	33	40	31	29	32	28				31
Bad opinion	22	19	22	22	17	23	15	12	7				9
Very bad opinion	9	7	5	6	3	8	3	3	1				6
No opinion	37	33	34	26	17	26	33	30	27				21
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%				100%
Net Favorable	-22	-13	-17	-15	3	-19	2	8	29				18
<u>In Italy</u>	(808)	(814)	(826)	(802)	(803)	(911)	(634)	(807)		(1076)	(691)	(650)	(579)
Very good opinion	11%	12%	12%	10%	29%	14%	14%	19%		17%	17%	20%	19%
Good opinion	27	26	25	25	34	28	31	34	NA	30	30	31	30
Neither	21	24	23	23	25	20	24	17		23	22	20	22
Bad opinion	9	7	13	9	5	10	6	8		6	4	3	7
Very bad opinion	5	4	4	5	-	2	3	4		4	2	2	5
No opinion	27	27	23	28	7	26	22	18		20	25	24	28
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%		100%	100%	100%	100%
Net Favorable	24	27	20	21	58	30	36	41		37	41	46	29

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"Please use this card to tell me your feelings about various countries. How about..... FRANCE?"

<u>In Great Britain</u>	Oct. '54	Feb. '55	June '55	Aug. '55	Dec. '55	Apr. '56	Nov. '56	May '57	Nov. '57	Oct. '58	Nov. '59	Dec. '59	Feb. '60
No. of cases	(832)	(805) ¹	(800)	(800)	(770)	(806)	(605)	(605)	(800)	(1198)			(613)
Very good opinion	5%	4%	9%	5%	3%	4%	9%	12%	5%	4%			2%
Good opinion	19	18	17	25	20	15	32	25	12	24	NA	NA	19
Neither	45	47	45	42	43	46	38	37	48	36			35
Bad opinion	11	12	10	9	13	10	7	4	10	14			21
Very bad opinion	2	3	4	3	4	2	1	1	5	3			4
No opinion	18	16	15	16	17	23	13	21	20	19			19
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%			100%
Net Favorable	11	7	12	18	6	7	33	32	2	11			-4
<u>In West Germany</u>	(836)	(820)	(857)	(865)	(813)	(863)	(589)	(611)	(813)	(610)			(599)
Very good opinion	1%	4%	4%	2%	1%	4%	1%	1%	1%	1%			1%
Good opinion	11	10	16	15	10	11	8	16	18	26	NA	NA	24
Neither	35	44	37	42	40	33	26	43	37	38			42
Bad opinion	33	24	23	17	21	29	36	21	24	15			16
Very bad opinion	7	8	6	3	6	9	9	3	3	2			1
No opinion	13	14	14	21	22	18	20	16	17	18			16
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%			100%
Net Favorable	-28	-22	-9	-3	-16	-27	-36	-7	-8	10			8
<u>In Italy</u>	(808)	(814)	(826)	(802)	(803)	(911)	(605)	(634)	(807)	(635)	(691)	(650)	(591)
Very good opinion	3%	5%	6%	4%	3%	7%	4%	7%	7%	10%	6%	8%	6%
Good opinion	18	28	28	31	23	31	23	36	30	33	33	36	24
Neither	37	34	36	34	39	37	31	34	32	30	34	29	30
Bad opinion	15	9	12	9	16	9	20	8	12	11	5	6	12
Very bad opinion	5	2	2	3	4	2	7	3	4	4	4	2	4
No opinion	22	22	16	19	15	14	15	12	15	12	18	19	24
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Net Favorable	1	22	20	23	6	27	0	32	21	28	30	36	14

¹ Owing to an inadvertent transposition of columns that came to light in recent checking, the figures for U.S. and French standing in Great Britain in the February, 1955 survey have been in error in past presentations. They are now shown correctly and eliminate what appeared to be rather puzzling departures from expected levels of esteem.

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"Please use this card to tell me what your feelings are about political leaders in various countries. How about.....?"

OPINION OF MACMILLAN OF GREAT BRITAIN

<u>In West Germany</u>	May '57	Nov. '57	Nov. '59	Dec. '59	Feb. '60
No. of cases	(611)	(813)			(623)
Very good opinion	*%	1%			2%
Good opinion	21	18	NA	NA	28
Neither	26	21			33
Bad opinion	4	2			4
Very bad opinion	*	*			1
No opinion	49	58			32
	100%	100%			100%
Net Favorable	17	17			25
<u>In France</u>	(602)	(802)			(620)
Very good opinion	1%	-%			1%
Good opinion	15	9	NA	NA	27
Neither	22	24			30
Bad opinion	4	10			9
Very bad opinion	1	2			1
No opinion	57	55			32
	100%	100%			100%
Net Favorable	11	-3			18
<u>In Italy</u>	(634)	(807)	(691)	(650)	(579)
Very good opinion	4%	5%	7%	7%	7%
Good opinion	19	21	27	27	18
Neither	23	22	23	27	21
Bad opinion	4	4	3	5	3
Very bad opinion	2	3	2	2	2
No opinion	48	45	38	32	49
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Net Favorable	17	19	29	27	20

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OPINION OF ADENAUER OF WEST GERMANY

No. of cases	Great Britain						France						Italy							
	Oct. '54	Feb. '55	Nov. '57	Oct. '58	Nov. '59	Feb. '60	Oct. '54	Feb. '55	Nov. '57	Oct. '58	Nov. '59	Feb. '60	Oct. '54	Feb. '55	Nov. '57	Oct. '58	Nov. '59	Dec. '59	Feb. '60	
	(832)		(800)			(608)	(847)	(900)	(802)	(596)		(620)	(808)	(814)	(807)		(691)	(650)	(579)	
Very good opinion	9%		10%			5%	3%	3%	5%	11%		5%	16%	13%	27%		18%	18%	18%	
Good opinion	25	NA	30	NA	NA	33	10	17	24	37	NA	37	21	22	30	NA	29	33	27	
Neither	24		19			22	24	22	23	24		28	12	16	11		16	20	14	
Bad opinion	3		3			16	12	11	5	3		7	5	6	5		4	3	5	
Very bad opinion	1		1			3	5	7	2	-		2	2	3	3		1	*	3	
No opinion	38		37			21	46	40	41	25		21	44	40	24		32	26	33	
	100%		100%			100%	100%	100%	100%	100%		100%	100%	100%	100%		100%	100%	100%	
Net Favorable	30		36			19	-4	2	22	45		33	30	26	49		42	48	37	

OPINION OF DE GAULLE OF FRANCE

	Great Britain			West Germany			Italy			
	Oct. '58	Nov. '59	Feb. '60	Oct. '58	Nov. '59	Feb. '60	Oct. '58	Nov. '59	Dec. '59	Feb. '60
No. of cases	(587)		(608)	(585)		(623)	(637)	(691)	(650)	(579)
Very good opinion	16%		9%	3%		1%	8%	10%	11%	8%
Good opinion	41	NA	37	24	NA	17	22	28	34	21
Neither	14		19	29		34	25	23	24	25
Bad opinion	8		15	7		21	12	7	7	4
Very bad opinion	2		3	2		3	4	4	2	7
No opinion	19		17	35		24	29	28	22	35
	100%		100%	100%		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Net Favorable	47		28	18		-6	14	27	36	18